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Tax shelters and aggressive planning derive in part from a structural imbalance 
in our tax system that has not been adequately explored:  In important respects, the 
private tax bar outmatches their counterparts in government.  Although a strong policy 
case can be made for remedying this mismatch, this Article emphasizes two institutional 
barriers that complicate any solution, rooted in the political economy of taxation and the 
economics and professional norms of the legal profession.  First, although it would be 
enormously helpful to dramatically increase the staffing levels and pay of government tax 
administrators, this is a politically daunting task.  Second, a fallback strategy is to look to 
the private bar for help, but they face a significant conflict.  Both market pressure and 
professional norms motivate them to serve their clients, who generally do not have an 
interest in improving government tax enforcement.   
 
In light of these two challenges, what can be done to mitigate the mismatch 
between the government and private bar?  This Article offers two sets of proposals.  
First, a number of suggestions focus on the government, offering ways to improve 
recruiting and reinforce the expertise at their disposal without dramatically increasing 
funding or raising pay substantially across the board.  For example, the government 
should focus on recruiting senior lawyers out of retirement (whose financial demands 
will be limited) and having them mentor junior lawyers directly from law school (whose 
private sector pay is high, but not nearly as high as it will become in later years).  The 
government should also consider a loan forgiveness program for these recent graduates, 
and should also enlist academics to assist with discrete projects.  The government should 
also retain private law firms to litigate tax controversies with extraordinary precedential 
value. 
 
Second, this Article offers guidance about the right way (and the wrong way) to 
tap the expertise and information possessed by the private bar.  It is more effective, 
whenever possible, to ask lawyers to help the government in a way that also helps their 
clients.  Using this principle, this Article identifies promising opportunities that have 
been overlooked, and critiques unpromising initiatives that have attracted significant 
government support.  For example, clients do not want their own tax deals shut down, but 
they feel differently about their competitor’s deals, so the government should make more 
systematic use of this opportunity.  Likewise, although clients are less motivated to help 
the government identify bad transactions that are inadvertently permitted, they are highly 
motivated to identify good transactions that are inadvertently prohibited.  As a result, the 
government can look to the private bar for help in narrowing overbroad anti-abuse 
measures.  On the other hand, in asking tax advisors to disclose their clients’ aggressive 
transactions – in effect, to “rat” on their clients – the government is asking for something 
that clearly is not in the clients’ interest.  This reality is likely to undercut this initiative, 
which has been one of the centerpieces of the government’s efforts to date. 
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 Tax shelters have proliferated in the United States not only because of financial 
innovation, the globalization of capital markets, the increasing complexity of our tax 
system, the inadequacy of tax penalties, the lack of political support for tax reform, and 
the growing popularity of textualist interpretation – all factors that have attracted 
considerable attention in the literature.1  Shelters also derive from a structural imbalance 
in our tax system that has not been adequately explored:  In important respects, the 
private tax bar outmatches their counterparts in government.  This imbalance is one of 
sheer numbers, of access to information, and, at least in some cases, of sophistication and 
expertise.  The problem is evident not only in the low audit rate,2 a familiar issue, but also 
in the way the government staffs drafting projects and litigation.  Unfortunately, this 
mismatch helps breed the familiar equity and efficiency concerns associated with 
aggressive planning.3   
Even though a strong case can be made for remedying this mismatch, this Article 
emphasizes two institutional barriers that complicate any solution, rooted in the political 
economy of taxation and the economics and professional norms of the legal profession.  
First, although a dramatic increase in the staffing levels and pay of government tax 
administrators would be good policy, this is a politically daunting step.  The levels of pay 
necessary to be competitive with top private lawyers sound utterly outlandish to the 
typical voter, since current government salaries (which are 90% less than what top 
                                                 
1 The literature on tax shelters is massive.  Joe Bankman wrote an important early piece on the subject.  See 
Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 Tax Notes 1775 (June 21, 1995).  
Volume 54 of the SMU Law Review and Volume 55 of the Tax Law Review have each published 
interesting symposia on the subject. 
2 See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Corporate Risk of Tax Audit is Still Shrinking, I.R.S. Data Show, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 12, 2004, at C1 (audit rate fell for firms with over $ 250 million in assets from 33.7% in 2002 
to 29% in 2003). 
3 For a discussion of these equity and efficiency problems, see David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint 
on Tax Planning, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1312 (2001). 
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lawyers earn) are already multiples of the median household income.  Given the 
unpopularity of the IRS, moreover, underfunded tax administration has an almost 
irresistible political advantage: It is an under-the-radar tax cut – appreciated by those who 
benefit from it – that purports not to be a tax cut at all, but an effort to cut “fat” from an 
unpopular federal bureaucracy.   
Since dramatic infusions of resources for tax enforcement are unlikely, a fallback 
strategy is to look to the private bar, enlisting their help in combating aggressive tax 
planning.  This brings us to the second institutional source of the mismatch between the 
government and private bar: the conflict faced by the private bar.  Both market pressure 
and professional norms motivate them to serve their clients, who generally do not have an 
interest in improving government tax enforcement.  As a result, appeals to the bar’s 
conscience4 or their commitment to professionalism5 will be of only limited use.   
In light of these twin challenges – the political difficulties of increasing funding 
and salaries and the structural difficulties of relying on private lawyers – what can be 
done to mitigate the mismatch between the government and private bar?  Although there 
are no perfect solutions, this Article offers two sets of proposals.  The first group focuses 
on the government, offering ways to upgrade the government’s expertise without 
                                                 
4 Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the Tax Bar Into Dissuading Corporate Tax 
Shelters, 21 Va. Tax Rev. 43 (2001) Because Professor Lavoie believes that “Most lawyers involved in 
corporate tax shelter activity are deeply troubled by the role they play,” he says they will help combat 
shelters if the government, in effect, gives them an excuse to do so.  They need a reason to raise the 
inadvisability of shelters with clients and, armed with the right mandates or doctrines (e.g., a duty to verify 
the facts recited in a tax opinion), they will do so.  In addition, Lavoie would “impress practitioners with a 
sense of obligation to uphold the tax laws” through education, including in law school.  Although I agree 
that many tax lawyers find shelters to be objectionable, and that it is valuable to encourage lawyers to feel a 
personal obligation to protect the tax system, the focus of my analysis is less on appeals to conscience, and 
more on appeals to self interest.    
5 Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, Yale J. Reg. 
(forthcoming 2006).  Professor Rostain emphasizes the ways in which the ABA and NYSBA Tax Sections 
have supported government efforts to rein in tax shelters.  Yet she does not focus on the merits of various 
anti-tax-shelter measures, but on the role of bar associations in this process and the associated lessons to be 
learned about professionalism. 
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dramatically increasing funding or raising pay across the board.  For example, the 
government should focus on recruiting senior lawyers out of retirement (whose financial 
demands will be limited) and having them mentor junior lawyers directly from law 
school (whose private sector pay is high, but not nearly as high as it will become in later 
years).  The government ought to consider a loan forgiveness program for these recent 
graduates.  In addition, the government should enlist academics to assist with discrete 
projects, and should retain private law firms to litigate tax controversies with 
extraordinary precedential value.  This Article considers and rejects a more radical 
proposal for the government to rely on private attorneys general to aid in tax collection. 
Second, this Article offers guidance about the right way (and the wrong way) to 
tap the expertise and information possessed by the private bar.  It is more effective, 
whenever possible, to ask lawyers to help the government in a way that also helps their 
clients.  Although this principle is straightforward – even obvious – it has not been 
invoked, at least as far as I know, to determine which functions the private bar can 
usefully perform in this context.  Using this principle, this Article identifies promising 
opportunities that have been overlooked, and critiques unpromising initiatives that have 
attracted significant government support.  For example, clients do not want their own tax 
deals shut down, but they feel differently about their competitor’s deals, so the 
government should make more systematic use of this opportunity.  Likewise, although 
clients are less motivated to help the government identify bad transactions that are 
inadvertently permitted, they are highly motivated to identify good transactions that are 
inadvertently prohibited.  As a result, the government can look to the private bar for help 
in narrowing overbroad anti-abuse measures.  On the other hand, in asking tax advisors to 
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disclose their clients’ aggressive transactions – in effect, to “rat” on their clients – the 
government is asking for something that clearly is not in the clients’ interest.  This reality 
is likely to undercut this initiative, which has been one of the centerpieces of the 
government’s efforts to date. 
 The first part of this Article elaborates on the mismatch between the government 
and the private bar, explaining why the problem is so entrenched.   Part II considers ways 
to hire better government lawyers, both for full time responsibilities and for discrete 
projects.  Parts III and IV focuses on how to tap the expertise of private lawyers without 
hiring them directly.  Part III explores initiatives in which the interests of the government 
and the client are aligned, at least to an extent, so that the bar faces less of a conflict in 
assisting the government.  In contrast, Part IV explores initiatives in which the interests 
of the government and client are in conflict.  These initiatives can succeed only if the 
government can detach lawyers from their client’s interests with sufficiently powerful 
carrots or sticks.  This is possible, in some cases, but it is never easy.  Part V is the 
conclusion. 
 
I. The Entrenched Mismatch Between the Government and Private Bar   
 There is an old story about someone who loves Beethoven and is invited by his 
brother to hear a performance of the Ninth Symphony.  Soon after agreeing 
enthusiastically, he is disappointed to learn that the symphony will be performed by his 
niece’s Middle School orchestra.   
 The point here, obviously, is that a symphony is beautiful only if played properly.  
Likewise, a set of tax rules will have their intended effect only if administered properly.  
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The U.S. tax law is filled with complex rules that aspire to capture economic nuance.  Yet 
these rules can only be effective if they can be implemented – not by some idealized tax 
administrator, but by the flesh-and-blood administrators we have.  In short, the quality of 
the people who draft rules, audit returns and litigate controversies is profoundly 
important to the integrity of our system.   
 This Part argues that there is a mismatch in expertise and numbers between the 
government administrators who seek to collect tax from sophisticated taxpayers and the 
private lawyers who represent these high net worth individuals and large corporations.  
(The balance is different for the average taxpayer, but that aspect of our tax system is 
beyond the scope of this Article.)  This Part then offers a theory about why this mismatch 
is difficult to correct, grounded both in political economy and in the economics and 
professional norms of the legal profession. 
A. The Mismatch  
The aggressive tax planning of sophisticated taxpayers relies on three familiar 
failures of government tax administration.  Although a broad phenomenon within our tax 
system, these failures are easiest to see with tax shelters – transactions that rely on a 
strained reading of the relevant tax provision to claim inflated deductions, to avoid 
including otherwise taxable income, and the like.    
First, shelters (and, indeed, all aggressive planning) exploit poor drafting of 
statutes and regulations.  The relevant rules are capable of being read (albeit 
aggressively) to allow, for example, tax losses with no corresponding economic losses.  
Drafters need to anticipate this sort of misreading more effectively.  This task is 
especially important – and especially difficult – when judges focus on text, instead of on 
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congressional purpose, and construe ambiguities against the government.  Textualist 
judges cannot be counted on to ask, “why would Congress allow such a generous result?”  
Instead, they consider it the job of Congress or the Treasury, not the courts, to shut down 
abusive transactions.  Meanwhile, the practice in Congress and Treasury is to act 
prospectively, grandfathering early deals.  This means that drafters cannot afford to make 
mistakes – but, unfortunately, they often do.  It is extremely difficult even for an 
experienced drafter, who has ample time, to anticipate all relevant contingencies.  This is 
all the more true when language is cobbled together in the middle of the night – as is 
often the case – by drafters who do not have deep experience practicing in the relevant 
area.   
Second, tax shelters obviously take advantage of poor auditing.  Even if the 
taxpayer’s argument on the merits is weak, the tax will never be paid if the transaction is 
not challenged on audit.  Taxpayers have been encouraged to play this “audit lottery” by 
the low percentage of high income returns that are audited, as well as by the 
unsophistication of some auditors and their auditing techniques.6  Indeed, tax shelters 
often have extraneous pieces that are included solely to befuddle auditors.  Facing a large 
and complicated return, auditors try to intuit what questions to ask, without really 
knowing where the bodies are buried.  Some auditors are further weakened by a civil 
servant’s nine-to-five mentality. “The key to a successful audit [from the taxpayer’s 
perspective],” the tax director of a large multinational once told me, “is to give the 
                                                 
6 See generally Alex Raskolnikov, The Self-Adjusting Tax Penalty, 106 Columbia Law Review 
(forthcoming 2006).  
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auditor an office near the elevator: this way, the auditor will feel comfortable going home 
early, since he won’t have to pass anyone else’s office on the way out.”7 
Third, even if the auditor discovers the aggressive transaction, the government 
litigators who pursue the matter usually are more leanly staffed and less experienced than 
taxpayer’s counsel.  The government must settle most of its cases and, when it litigates, it 
sometimes offers concessions that it should not offer8 and, more generally, loses cases it 
should win.  These lost cases have a troubling ripple effect, serving as precedent that 
aggressive taxpayers in turn use to justify other aggressive transactions.  This prospect of 
adverse precedent is all the more reason for the government to avoid risky litigation, a 
reality that is not lost on aggressive taxpayers.  They know that, even in the worst case in 
which their transaction is identified on audit, they have a good chance to settle on 
favorable terms (e.g., no penalties) or, if necessary, to litigate with some prospect of 
success.9  So why not roll the dice? 
The mismatches in each of the three phases described above – in drafting rules, in 
auditing returns, and in litigating cases – all arise, to a significant degree, from a common 
source: the limited resources allocated to tax administration.  This underfunding itself has 
three manifestations.  First, the government is chronically understaffed.  At the drafting 
stage, there are simply not enough people to plug holes that are constantly being detected 
in the tax law – let alone to think proactively about how to improve the system.  Statutory 
gaps and ambiguities endure for years, while only a few technical corrections are enacted 
                                                 
7 This conversation took place in 1997, and the tax director in question would prefer not to be named. 
8 For instance, in the Compaq case, the government stipulated to the fact that the taxpayer owned the 
relevant stock, thereby giving up a promising argument that could have won the case.  See Daniel N. 
Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 Tax Notes 221, 223 
(2000).  The government presumably did not make this concession carelessly. They must have hoped to 
win on economic substance or business purpose, preferring these theories to ownership because they would 
have more general application.  
9 See generally Bankman, supra note 1. 
 11
every session.10  Likewise, the Treasury often takes years to issue draft regulations on an 
issue, and then still more time to finalize them.  There are simply not enough people to do 
this work.  The same is true for auditors, who must comb through piles of documents in a 
treasure hunt for inappropriate items.  It is not unusual for one or two auditors to sit in a 
room with two or three times as many representatives for the taxpayer.  This pattern 
repeats in litigation, where a young Assistant U.S. Attorney, who is devoting a small 
fraction of her time to a case, opposes a team of lawyers for the taxpayer. 
The second manifestation of tight budgets is that government tax administrators 
are not of uniformly high quality or deep experience.  Many are relatively new to the 
profession, signing up for government service as a way to accelerate their careers.  The 
elephant in the room is the enormous pay differential between government and the 
private sector.  A junior lawyer in the I.R.S. will earn half what a junior lawyer at a firm 
makes, and the gap grows significantly wider as a lawyer becomes more senior, so that 
senior government officials earn less than ten percent of what some senior private 
attorneys earn.11  The government offers offsetting advantages, of course, such as work 
that is extremely interesting, the power to shape the tax system, the satisfaction of serving 
the country, and, as noted above, the chance to build a professional reputation quickly.  
The reality is, though, that many of the government’s best people stay only a few years, 
leaving ultimately for more lucrative private sector responsibilities.  In addition, many of 
the nation’s best tax lawyers never serve in government at all.   
                                                 
10 In addition to lean staffing, political considerations contribute to this problem, including the fact that a 
loophole-closing provision can be tarred as a “tax increase.”  Another problem with technical corrections is 
that interest groups sometimes view them as a wedge to revisit substantive provisions, sucking up more 
staff time and possibly leading to new potential loopholes.    
11 See Interview with Donald Korb, Chief Counsel, I.R.S., Section of Taxation, Fall 2005, available on 
www.fedbar.org.  The gap between government and private sector pay has grown wider over time.  For 
instance, thirty years ago, the starting salary at the I.R.S. and private law firms was approximately the 
same.    
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In addition to being understaffed and underpaid, the government is at a third 
disadvantage, relative to the private bar, which is as much structural as financial: they 
suffer from an imbalance in information.  In a self-reporting system, the initiative lies 
with taxpayers.  They have the freedom to structure their affairs, inevitably choosing the 
tax efficient course.12  They have the further advantage of controlling the flow of 
information to the government, offering only what the government requests (and, even 
then, typically construing the government’s request in a self-interested way).  Without a 
significant investment in gathering information, the government may have to wait years 
before discovering a new tax planning technique.  There is also the risk that, by the time 
they do discover it, they will feel constrained not to challenge it, given the heavy volume 
of transactions that already have taken advantage of it, and the political clout behind 
those transactions.13 
Readers who are not tax experts may wonder whether the mismatch described 
here is unique to tax administration.  Is there a parallel mismatch between SEC lawyers 
and the securities bar that represents large public companies, or between prosecutors and 
elite white collar lawyers, or between EPA lawyers and the elite environmental bar?  
Although the question is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth a brief comment.  I 
suspect that such a mismatch does exist in other areas of law, but that the tax mismatch 
may be especially significant for three reasons.  First, government lawyers are not 
backstopped by private attorneys general as they are, for instance, in the securities field 
                                                 
12 In other work, I have referred to this phenomenon as the taxpayer’s “planning option.”  See David M. 
Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1339 
(2001). 
13See IRS Acting Chief Counsel Challenges “Wall Street Rule” at TEI Conference, Tax Analysts, Sep. 22, 
2003 (using the phrase “Wall Street Rule” to describe idea that a deal that has become sufficiently common 
is politically difficult to challenge). 
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by the plaintiff’s bar.  Second, tax rules generally are written narrowly and precisely – 
unlike some criminal statutes, for instance, which cover more conduct than is really 
culpable, and leave it to prosecutorial discretion to determine who is prosecuted.  As a 
result, the tax authorities are more likely to face conduct that violates the spirit, but not 
the letter, of the regime, and thus the lawyering challenge of using not-quite-on-point 
rules to stop it.  Third, the tax regime – for capital, especially – may be more malleable 
than other regimes, such that good lawyering (and, correspondingly, mismatches in 
lawyering between the government and private bar) are especially significant.  In other 
regimes, unalterable physical realities often backstop legal distinctions, so that there is 
only so much a lawyer can do to change the result.  Even if one country’s environmental 
laws are more favorable than another, a lawyer can’t move a factory from one jurisdiction 
to another.  But a tax lawyer can easily shift certain types of income from one jurisdiction 
to another without changing anything substantive; for example, does it matter which 
corporate entity – the Delaware subsidiary or the Cayman Islands subsidiary – holds the 
business’s intangibles?  Likewise, if environmental laws treat cars and trucks differently, 
there is only so much a lawyer can do to classify a car as a truck.  Yet a tax lawyer would 
not say the same thing about the debt-equity distinction.  In the taxation of capital 
especially, frictions are weak, so that the quality of lawyering alone makes an enormous 
difference. 
B. Why the Mismatch Is So Entrenched 
 Since the mismatch between government and private lawyers is an important 
cause of aggressive tax planning, it would be eminently sensible to correct the mismatch.  
The government could raise more revenue, and could do so more fairly and efficiently.  
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Aggressive taxpayers would lose their edge over conservative ones, and also would see 
less advantage to investing time and resources in tax planning.  Indeed, with better 
drafting and enforcement, the government could cut rates without losing revenue.  Thus, 
although additional government expenditures on tax administration are admittedly a form 
of social waste, they foreclose another form of waste – private expenditures on tax 
planning.  As long as spending another dollar on administration reduces at least a dollar 
of planning waste, the expenditure is socially worthwhile.14  For example, if the 
government invests in writing a well-crafted regulation to resolve an ambiguity in the 
law, this up-front expenditure saves the tax bar countless hours of analysis about how to 
handle the ambiguity, and also heads off aggressive strategies that take advantage of it.15       
Yet although the advantages of better administration may seem irresistible, they 
are consistently resisted.  This Section offers a theory about why the mismatch between 
the government and private bar is so deeply entrenched.  In essence, there are two main 
paths away from the status quo, but neither is easy.  The first, involving greater 
government expenditures on administration, is blocked by political constraints, since 
overly-lean enforcement functions as a tax cut with an almost irresistible political 
advantage: it can be presented not as a tax cut at all, but as an effort to “wring the fat” 
from the unpopular I.R.S. bureaucracy.  The second path away from the status quo, 
involving greater public responsibilities for private lawyers, is obstructed by the 
professional norms and economics of the legal profession, since private lawyers face a 
                                                 
14 It is a fallacy to say that the government should spend up to a dollar on tax enforcement to collect a dollar 
of revenue.  The better test is to spend up to a dollar on tax enforcement to avoid a dollar of social waste 
from tax planning.  For a discussion of this point, and of the marginal efficiency cost of funds framework 
from which it derives, see generally Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and the 
Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds, 43 Int’l Monetary Fund Staff Papers 172 (1996). 
15 Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 562–70 (1992). 
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significant conflict in helping the government combat aggressive planning.  Although 
some progress on each dimension is possible, this is a difficult problem to solve.  
1. Politics: The Constraint on Enlisting the Public Bar 
Before explaining the political obstacles to better tax administration, it is worth 
emphasizing that there are, of course, political factors that counsel in favor of this goal.  
Making the tax system more efficient and equitable is good policy, which obviously 
should have some influence on political actors (although one has to be naïve to think such 
considerations are dispositive).  For a political actor focused on advancement, additional 
revenue is the mother’s milk of a career, since it can pay for profile-raising tax cuts or 
programs (but, of course, only if the political actor is able to steer this revenue in her 
preferred direction).  Likewise, “I caught the tax cheats” is an appealing reelection 
slogan, especially when tax fraud is salient in the public mind.   
For a number of reasons, however, it is politically difficult to introduce substantial 
increases in the staffing or salaries of government tax lawyers.  For one thing, taxes on 
sophisticated taxpayers – or, at least, taxes on investment returns – are controversial.  
Within the academy and the body politic, a significant group believes that investment 
returns should not be taxed (a position with which I have a great deal of sympathy).  
Likewise, there are concerns that high marginal rates on wages discourage economic 
growth.  Although no one would defend poor enforcement as a first-best method of 
reducing taxes (since rate cuts are always more efficient and equitable), some might opt 
for poor enforcement as a second-best means of cutting a tax that can’t be cut more 
directly.   
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Indeed, hidden tax cuts are a deeply entrenched feature of our political life.  For 
example, the difference between an effective loophole-closing measure and an ineffective 
one tends to be quite technical, so that the general public and the media often cannot 
discern the difference.  Indeed, only a small cohort of trained experts can truly tell 
whether the shelter is being shut down, and these experts have developed their expertise 
in the service of taxpayers – often, the very taxpayers who have been using the shelter.  
Given how hard it is for the public to monitor these technical issues, it is tempting for 
self-interested political actors to propose half-measures that are not fully effective.  These 
partial responses offer their sponsors the best of both political worlds, allowing them to 
score points with the general public for “shutting down” the shelter while, ironically, also 
scoring points with the affected taxpayers for doing so “in a reasonable way” that leaves 
them other deals to do.16  Similarly, passing rules that seem to respond to tax planning, 
while providing insufficient funding for the effective administration of these rules, allows 
political actors to claim credit with voters without actually impeding, and thus offending, 
aggressive taxpayers.17     
While the political support for taxes is unenthusiastic at best, the political support 
for tax enforcement and administration is even more ambivalent.  No one sails to 
                                                 
16 For a discussion of this dynamic, see generally Schizer, supra note 3.   
17 In light of this interest-group dynamic, as well as the broader political opposition to taxing capital, it is 
fair to wonder how significant the staffing issues emphasized in this Article really turn out to be.  If 
political factors prevent a vigorous government response to shelters, then the question of how many 
government lawyers work on these issues and how much experience they have becomes less important.  An 
extreme version of this claim is that, even if the government were populated only by the leading lights of 
the profession, nothing will change because the political leadership will stop them from doing anything 
meaningful.  A corollary is that top notch people will refuse to serve if they are constrained in this way, 
since the job will not be sufficiently interesting.  But in this extreme form, the claim is unpersuasive.  A 
more balanced assessment is that the political winds tend to shift, depending upon which party is in power, 
whether a booming economy is already filling the government’s coffers, whether a war or other large scale 
initiative requires extra revenue, and the like.  These fluctuating factors filter down to tax enforcement, 
determining whether the political appointees who manage the process will flog their staff to react forcefully 
or restrain them from doing so.  In this sort of cyclical environment, the capacity of the staff to respond 
effectively obviously remains quite important. 
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reelection on the platform, “more money for the I.R.S!”  Indeed, consider what would 
happen if the Washington Post began publishing stories about the millions spent on hiring 
elite tax lawyers, while lunch money for public school children was being cut.  The 
reaction of members of Congress is easy to predict.  Needless to say, U.S. voters have 
little affection for the I.R.S.  Perhaps there is an element of national mythology at work 
here.  The tax collector is unlikely to be a hero in a nation founded in a rebellion against 
British taxes.  The rhetoric of limited government and individual initiative is pervasive in 
U.S. public life.  This anti-tax collector feeling is certainly reinforced by the bad 
experiences almost everyone has had, at some point, with the lower level I.R.S. 
bureaucracy.  Obviously, there is a political constituency that wants to stoke this anti-
I.R.S. feeling: high income taxpayers who benefit from lax enforcement.  As noted 
above, providing insufficient funding for tax administration is a way to cut taxes that can 
be presented, not as a tax cut, but as a “good government” initiative to trim “waste” from 
an unpopular federal bureaucracy.  As the Republicans showed in hearings on I.R.S. 
misconduct in the late 1990’s, tax administration is an easy political target.18   
Raising the salary of government tax lawyers, so that pay is more competitive 
with the seven figure salaries earned by top private lawyers, is an especially hard sell.  
The essential problem is that these private lawyers earn so much more than the median 
household income, which currently is just over $46,000.19  A salary three times this level 
for senior government lawyers seems quite high to the median voter, but is only a small 
fraction of what a top lawyer earn in private practice.  Likewise, it is difficult to raise the 
                                                 
18 See House Comm. Gov. Oversight, 105-43, Internal Revenue Service Mismanagement and Ideas for 
Improvement, Apr. 14, 1997. 
19This information comes from a press release from the US Census Bureau, Aug. 29, 2006.  See 
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/income_wealth/007419.html 
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salary of government tax lawyers, without also raising the salary of other government 
experts who are also underpaid.   To pose the most extreme case, should leading tax 
administrators really earn as much as (or more than) the President?20     
This is not to say that government enforcement cannot be improved at all.  The 
case on the merits is powerful, as is public opposition to tax fraud, as well as the 
incentives of public actors to raise revenue.  The point is that significant political 
constraints limit what can be done, requiring incrementalism, careful thought, and 
compromise.  In light of these limits, it is also worth considering whether private lawyers 
can be induced to supplement these efforts.  Put another way, the mismatch between the 
government and the private bar is likely to endure, at least to a degree.  The question, 
then, is whether the government can somehow make use of the private bar’s expertise, 
without hiring them directly.      
  2. Conflicts: The Constraint on Enlisting the Private Bar 
In other words, can the private tax bar be enlisted to help the government?  For 
example, can private lawyers be interrogated to discover where the loopholes are in 
particular rules?  The reality is that it is quite difficult to force the private bar to do what 
they do not want do to.   
At a minimum, there is a significant political problem.  The opposition of bar 
associations, for instance, can be a formidable political hurdle.21  This is not to say that it 
is insurmountable.  Particularly in times of crisis, when the public eye is focused on a 
                                                 
20 The President currently earns a salary of $400,000.  Title 3, section 102 of USCA,   from Pub. L. 108-
199,  Jan 23, 2004. 
21 As Professor Rostain notes, the NYSBA and ABA supported some recent anti-shelter initiatives.  See 
Rostain, supra note 5.  But it is worth emphasizing that the NYSBA and ABA did not support all of the 
initiatives, and they supported some only on the condition that they be modified.  For example, the 
organized bar opposed codifying the economic substance doctrine and, not surprisingly, this provision was 
not enacted. 
 19
problem, additional mandates sometimes can be crammed down the throats of 
professional advisors.  This is something securities lawyers have seen recently in 
Sarbanes Oxley and, to an extent, tax lawyers have seen as well in the government 
response to tax shelters.  But in ordinary political conditions, the general public remains 
blissfully ignorant of the details of a technical regime such as the tax law, and experts 
represent one of the key constituencies that understand, and actually focus on, this body 
of rules.  Under these circumstances, it is difficult to force experts to discharge a 
responsibility they do not want. 
 Even if the political will can be mustered, there is the further problem of ensuring 
compliance.  Will the private bar actually do what they have been asked to do?  At first 
blush, this is a surprising problem to raise.  After all, lawyers are as likely as anyone to 
obey the law – more so, really.  But the point here is that there is a difference between 
actually complying – in the sense of truly giving the government the help they are 
seeking – and merely going through the motions.  Indeed, tax lawyers are a creative 
bunch, and they know how to avoid providing help, while seeming to do what is asked of 
them.  Needless to say, you can count on tax lawyers to find ambiguities in almost any 
government instruction.  Of course, if the government had perfect information and ample 
staff to monitor whether lawyers were complying with these directives, then lawyers 
presumably would comply more faithfully.  But obviously that is not the case.  Indeed, 
the reason private lawyers are being asked to help is that government capabilities are 
limited. 
The broader point, then, is that if the tax bar doesn’t want to help, they will find 
ways to avoid helping.  This brings us to an essential question: When, if ever, will the tax 
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bar be willing to help?  Do they ever have the incentive to assist the government?  I 
believe the answer is “yes” in certain special circumstances, which the government 
should exploit to the fullest.  But before we get to these exceptional circumstances, we 
should begin with the general answer, which is a resounding “no.”  Most of the time, 
private lawyers can not be counted on to help the government for two self-evident 
reasons. 
First, and most importantly, lawyers are eternally mindful of who pays their bill.  
They worry about keeping their clients, and about attracting new ones.  Clients obviously 
want to pay as little tax as possible.  They certainly do not want their paid advisors to 
help the government raise their tax bill.  A tax lawyer who is known to help the 
government collect more tax from his client is unlikely to remain a tax lawyer for long.  
More generally, lawyers are looking to advance the interests of their client, and, 
ordinarily, a client’s interests are adverse to those of the government.       
 Professional norms supply a second reason why lawyers will be reluctant to help 
the government.  In our adversarial system, lawyers generally owe duties to their own 
client, but not to the other side.  In tax planning, the other side is the government, and 
even when a lawyer is giving advice about planning, she focuses on what would happen 
if the matter is litigated.  Will the client’s strategy succeed if tested in court?  How can 
the client’s position be strengthened?  To a tax advisor who is thinking through these 
issues, the government is, quite frankly, the enemy.  The client, meanwhile, looms very 
large in the lawyer’s professional obligations.  Stirring rhetoric is often used to describe 
the attorney-client relationship – a “sacred trust,” and the like.  The lawyer is supposed to 
advocate for a client’s interest zealously (within the bounds of the law, of course), and 
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the lawyer is supposed to keep a client’s confidences.  The details of a client’s 
transactions are a client’s property, and a lawyer generally is not supposed to disclose 
them to anyone. Given these client-focused professional norms, it is not a comfortable 
thing to provide help to the government.  Although a tax lawyer may owe a separate duty 
to the tax system – a point discussed below – her primary allegiance is to her client. 
 To reinforce this point, consider the contrast between tax shelters and the 
corporate scandals of the last decade.  At first blush, there are obvious similarities.  They 
each involve the manipulation of systems of financial reporting (whether accounting or 
tax), usually through strained readings of the relevant rule, paired with complex 
structures designed to obscure economic reality.  Yet a key difference is who is being 
deceived.  It is shareholders in the case of corporate scandals, versus the tax authorities in 
the case of shelters.  In the corporate context, it is a matter of concern that multiple layers 
of gatekeepers failed to protect shareholders, including research analysts and boards of 
directors.22  Yet at least there are multiple layers of gatekeepers in the corporate context; 
there are no such private gatekeepers for the tax system.  For example, a research analyst 
would rarely think she was obligated to notify the I.R.S. upon discovering that a company 
is engaging in tax shelters.     
 So far, in assessing the difficulty of arranging collaborations between the bar and 
the government, I have emphasized problems with the bar’s incentives.  But it is also 
worth observing a problem on the government’s side.  If they do not have to pay for the 
bar’s time, the government is less likely to use it efficiently.  The government may be 
tempted to assign the bar time-consuming tasks that are not cost justified.  As with any 
unfunded mandate, the costs do not fall on the government.  The point should not be 
                                                 
22 John C. Coffee, Gatekeepers (2006). 
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overstated, since there are political costs in wasting the bar’s time. But, as we shall see, 
there is a regrettable element of makework in some of the initiatives the government has 
proposed. 
To sum up, then, it is difficult for the government to enlist the tax bar’s help, 
given the bar’s incentives and, to a degree, the government’s as well.  But the operative 
word is “difficult,” not “impossible.”  Careful thought is required, and there obviously are 
some things that do not work, but there also are some that do.   
Part II considers various ways the government can hire private lawyers directly, 
consistent with the political constraints described above.  Parts III and IV discuss a range 
of ways the government can tap into the expertise of private lawyers without hiring them, 
while at the same time taking account of, and hopefully mitigating, the conflict discussed 
above. 
 
II. Enlisting Government Lawyers 
To sum up, the government does not have enough people working on tax 
administration, and the people it has are not all up to the task.  There are also political 
constraints on what can be done about this problem. This Section considers a range of 
ways to enhance the capabilities of government enforcement, including strategies for 
recruiting top talent for full time positions and new sources of expertise who could be 
retained for discrete projects.   
These government-focused strategies have the important advantage of (largely) 
avoiding the conflict that arises when the private bar’s assistance is sought.  Yet in 
steering clear of the Scylla of conflicts, they veer closer to the Charibdis of political 
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constraints, described above; thus, the effort here is to focus on ideas that either work 
within the government’s pay scale or can be justified by politically plausible rationales.  
These ideas are meant to be doable – or at least not too much of a stretch – in light of the 
political constraints described above.  The Section then concludes by considering (and 
rejecting) a more radical step in which private attorneys general would be enlisted to 
backstop government enforcement. 
A.  Full-Time Recruits 
1. A “Great Place to Start” – and Finish 
In recruiting top talent, the government should target people at stages in their 
career in which the pay gap is least significant.  An important category is recent law 
school graduates.  Although the pay gap is still significant, it is substantially less than the 
gap becomes once these graduates become partners at top firms (e.g., a 50% pay cut 
instead of a 90% pay cut).23  The government also can offer several nonmonetary benefits 
that private practice does not offer.  Because government staffing is so lean, these junior 
lawyers will bear significant responsibilities very quickly, developing invaluable skills 
and reputations.  Their hours will also be more manageable.  They also will have the 
satisfaction of performing a valuable public service.  Admittedly, the fact that these 
young lawyers will have a long career ahead of them – which is likely to include service 
to private clients – may introduce some conflict issues, as they may steer clear of 
offending potential employers; but this traditional concern about “revolving doors” 
should not be overstated.  After all, potential clients should be more impressed by (and 
thus more likely to hire) government lawyers who effectively advance the interests of 
                                                 
23 See Robert Guy Matthews, It’s Taxing to Recruit Top Law Grads to IRS, But a New Push Betters 
Returns, Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 2006, at B1 (entry level pay at IRS is $65,000 or $70,000, which is 
approximately half the starting salaries at top private firms). 
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their client (i.e., the government) than those who do favors for the other side.  To his 
credit, Donald Korb, the Chief Counsel of the I.R.S., has recognized the government’s 
comparative advantage with younger lawyers, and has launched the “Great Place to Start” 
initiative, designed to recruit them while they are in law school.  24 
Congress would be wise to complement this effort with a commitment to repay 
the student loans of a select group of highly capable graduates who enter government 
service.  This is necessary because tuition at top law schools is more than $40,000 per 
year.  When room and board is added in, students are spending over $200,000 in out-of- 
pocket costs on their legal education, much of which is financed by debt.  They may also 
have student loans from college.  This reality significantly undercuts the otherwise 
promising strategy of targeting recent law school graduates.  Even though the pay gap is 
narrower for recent graduates, their loans render them less able to afford any gap at all.  
Congress could solve this problem by forgiving a fraction of a student’s loans for every 
year she works for the government (coupled with a commitment from the student to work 
a minimum number of years). For example, if a student could emerge debt-free after 
working six years for the Treasury department, government service would become 
extremely attractive.  Of course, this is functionally similar to a pay increase, but 
structuring a raise in this way has political advantages.  The government isn’t committed 
to give this pay increase across the board, since a principle can be offered to distinguish 
these needy junior lawyers from other employees.  Also, a sympathetic story can be told 
to voters about why this program is necessary.   
                                                 
24 Robert Guy Matthews, It’s Taxing to Recruit Top Law Grads to IRS, But a New Push Betters Returns, 
Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 2006, at B1. 
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While junior lawyers should be an important component of the government’s 
hiring strategy, they need more senior lawyers to mentor them.  Another promising pool 
is made up of elite lawyers retiring from law firm practice.  The pay differential should 
be less significant for this group as well, since they will have accumulated significant 
savings; indeed, if they were prepared to accept no salary income as retirees, they should 
be satisfied with the government’s pay scale.  They may also be motivated by a desire to 
give back to the tax system.  They also have deep experience.  Mentoring a team of 
young and highly motivated junior lawyers could be quite an attractive proposition, and 
could leverage their expertise without placing excessive demands on their time.    They 
could slow down from the demands of a top private practice, while doing work that is 
interesting and meaningful.   
  2.  “First Response” Team 
While the focus above is on remaining (largely) within the government’s existing 
pay scale, there is much to be said for increasing the pay scale significantly for a small 
cohort of top people.  What if the government hired two dozen partners from leading 
firms at market rates – or, for that matter, even at half or a quarter of what they have 
been earning in practice?  Their expertise could be spread across the various regimes that 
are relevant to sophisticated taxpayers, including financial products, international tax, 
partnerships, and corporate tax.   
With this expertise, the government stands a better chance of winning more 
precedent-setting litigation and of writing tighter regulations.  This group could also 
serve as a first-response team.  As soon as they learn of an aggressive transaction (e.g., by 
reading one of Lee Sheppard’s columns, by receiving an anonymous tip, or by reviewing 
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disclosure received from a taxpayer), they could invite the taxpayer and their advisor to 
defend the transaction, and then make a judgment about whether to take special action to 
shut the deal down quickly (e.g., through a notice issued immediately), or to allow the 
government to consider the deal through its usual (slower) process.25  They can also 
review draft regulations and statutes to screen them for potential loopholes, and they can 
give advice to government litigators about strategy.        
Although this proposal involves a significant pay increase, it limits the increase to 
a small number of government lawyers, so that the budgetary impact is a rounding error 
within the tax enforcement budget.  The cost would easily be justified by increases in 
revenue and significant reductions in the social waste from tax planning.  Admittedly, 
there is the problem of inequity within the ranks of government employees.  The pay 
scale for this team could breed resentment among other government lawyers, and could 
also become the mantra for disgruntled advocates of other programs: “If we can afford to 
pay a salary of $X to a government tax lawyer,” they will say, “then surely we can afford 
my program.”   This proposal is not free of political issues, then, the benefits would be 
quite significant if it was adopted.     
 B. Project-Based Recruits 
In addition to recruiting full-time employees, the government can also reinforce 
tax administration by adding part-time employees (and, in some cases, volunteers) to 
assist with particular matters.  This Section considers some potentially promising options 
that should be relatively affordable and conflict-free. 
1. Legal Academics 
                                                 
25 I am indebted to David Miller for this suggestion. 
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An important source of experts, who will not face the same incentive problems as 
private lawyers, are legal academics.26  Tax professors have expertise in both legal and 
policy analysis, and many have practice experience.  Assuming they do not have private 
sector clients – and many do not – they do not face client conflicts in assisting the 
government with law reform or litigation.   
To my mind, academics are a significantly underutilized resource.  In part, the 
reason is that academics sometimes focus on research that does not have immediate 
practical application.  This research is still valuable, of course, in illuminating 
fundamental questions about the ideal system, in exposing hidden premises, and the like.   
But it is regrettable that some academics believe this is the only research that 
advances their reputations within the academy, and that more grounded projects are 
thought to be less helpful or even counterproductive.  Academics should devote some of 
their time to research that has a practical payoff, critiquing specific cases, rulings, or 
statutory provisions and offering reform alternatives that are capable of implementation.  
For example, Alvin Warren has written a thoughtful article on the challenges of taxing a 
company on transactions in its own stock.  Dan Shaviro has written a valuable article on 
the interest allocation rules, and David Weisbach has recently advised the President’s 
commission on tax reform.  These sorts of projects can have an enormously positive 
impact on our system.   
To do this sort of research effectively, academics should view interactions with 
the government as valuable field research, exposing them to novel issues and enriching 
their understanding.  In exchange for access, some academics would share their expertise 
free of charge or, certainly, for relatively modest levels of funding.  An added benefit to 
                                                 
26 I am indebted to Marvin Chirelstein and Alex Raskolnikov for this insight. 
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academics is that they can use the relationship to educate the government about their 
ideas, thereby increasing the probability that their proposals will be implemented. 
  2. Bar Associations 
 Although academics can be helpful, private lawyers obviously have an even 
deeper reservoir of knowledge about aggressive tax planning.  The challenge, of course, 
is to find ways for them to offer this knowledge free (or, at least, relatively free) of the 
conflict they face in helping the government.   
 To an extent, bar associations can provide this sort of setting.  For example, the 
New York State Bar Association’s Tax Section writes influential reports about regulatory 
projects and other reforms.  It is a matter of pride for the group that they focus on 
systemic concerns, not taxpayer interests.  The government obviously is well aware of 
these reports, and relies on them for technical advice.  As Professor Rostian has 
emphasized, the ABA and the NYSBA have taken positions on tax shelters that run 
contrary to the interests of their clients.27  An important reason why they can do this, 
which she does not mention, is the protection offered by collective authorship.  Although 
reports have principal authors, these authors speak for the group, not for themselves.  As 
a result, it is “safer” to expose client abuses in these collectively written reports, as 
opposed to solo-authored articles. This “safety in numbers” phenomenon is at least a 
partial remedy for the conflict  
Of course, the idea that bar associations are vehicles to help the government 
should not be overstated, since they sometimes serve as interest groups to champion the 
                                                 
27 See Rostain, supra note 5. 
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interests of lawyers and their clients.28   Indeed, another way to interpret the bar 
association’s position on tax shelters is as an effort to protect the interests of the elite bar.  
The comparative advantage of elite lawyers is in giving accurate predictions about what a 
court will do and, in the case of tax shelters, this often means saying “no.”  If government 
enforcement is weak, though, taxpayers may be less interested in accurate advice (the tax 
bar’s comparative advantage), and more interested in a less expert (and less principled) 
advisor who will simply facilitate the aggressive transaction.29  In response to this 
competition (from accounting firms, among others), it is rational for a self-interested elite 
lawyer to want government enforcement to improve as a way to raise the value of their 
services, and thus to help them beat back the competition. 
  3. Law Firms 
In addition to relying on private lawyers to volunteer their services through bar 
associations, the government can also retain elite practitioners for discrete projects 
instead of as full-time employees, just as corporate clients do.  This course has the 
advantage of using elite lawyers most efficiently – only when their services are especially 
valuable.  This approach also avoids the need to raise government salaries across the 
board or to tolerate significant inequities in the pay scale for in-house government 
lawyers.  Although the legal fees could be substantial – itself a separate political issue, to 
be sure – it is possible that private lawyers will offer a discounted rate in return for the 
prestige of working on an especially important matter.  In any event, the economic 
                                                 
28 Some pro-government tax lawyers have told me that they feel less at home in bar committees than they 
used to, and that the younger generation of bar leaders is more prone to taxpayer advocacy.  This may be a 
symptom of a broader generational trend within the tax bar, which others have observed.  See Bankman, 
supra note 1. 
29 Put another way, if all you need is an opinion – any opinion, which could provide penalty protection – 
you don’t need to hire one of the leading lights of the profession.  This issue is discussed below in Part III. 
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benefits of having top talent involved should justify the cost, for all the reasons 
mentioned above.  Obviously, the government entered into this sort of arrangement with 
David Boies, a top antitrust litigator, to represent the U.S. government in its suit against 
Microsoft.30 
There is still the issue of conflicts, though.  Will a lawyer feel comfortable 
representing the U.S. on tax issues, or will she (and her partners) be concerned about 
losing private clients?  Can a private lawyer represent the U.S. faithfully without also 
worrying about the interests of their other clients?   
The context that seems freest of conflicts – and thus most promising – is tax 
litigation.  In cases with significant precedential value, the government would be well 
advised to hire a leading practitioner, and this lawyer will have clear incentives to win.  
After all, success or failure is highly visible, so that the lawyer will have strong 
reputational interests in providing vigorous advocacy.  Of course, if a lawyer helped 
develop an aggressive strategy, she is not the right person to litigate the issue for the 
government.  The same probably is true if her partner developed the strategy.  Given the 
large pool of private sector talent, though, it ought to be possible to retain a tax litigator 
who has not had contact with the relevant issue before.   
In addition to litigation, elite law firms could advise on regulatory projects and 
statutory drafting.  They could be asked, for example, to draft a regulation.  The 
government could then review the work, but this input from leading lawyers could move 
the process along more quickly.  It is possible, moreover, that lawyers would work for a 
                                                 
30 See generally David Boies, Courting Justice (2005).  Of course, Boies charged the government a steeply 
discounted rate.  See Daniel Okrent, Get Me Boies, Time, December 17, 2000, at 
http://www.time.com/time/poy2000/mag/boies.html (noting that Boies charged only $40 per hour, 
compared with his usual $750 per hour rate at the time).  
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discounted rate, or even for free, if they were given credit for their work.31  A practitioner 
could find it valuable, in attracting clients, to be able to say that she drafted a relevant 
regulation.  In a sense, the government would be paying in prestige, rather than in cash.   
However, the conflict issue seems more difficult in this context than in litigation, 
in part because the scope of the project is less contained.  A lawyer’s other clients will 
not be interested in the details of a litigation (e.g., what discovery motions are filed, what 
the opening statement will be, etc.), but they will be very interested in the progress of a 
regulatory project.  Can a lawyer share this insight with clients?  Correspondingly, if a 
lawyer learns about planning opportunities through work for clients, can the lawyer use 
this knowledge in helping the government to tighten up the relevant provision?  If they 
do, clients will become more wary of consulting them in the future.  Likewise, there is a 
risk that a practitioner will deliberately leave gaps in a regulation he drafts for the 
government, and then will steer his clients through these loopholes.  To an extent, though, 
this risk is mitigated if government lawyers (and even other private practitioners) review 
the language before it is finalized.     
C.  The Promise and Pitfalls of Private Attorneys General 
 The problems of government resource constraints and private sector incentives are 
not unique to the tax system.  For example, the S.E.C. does not have a large or highly 
compensated staff.  Neither does the E.E.O.C.  As noted above, an important difference is 
that in these regulatory areas, and others as well, the government authorizes private 
                                                 
31 For example, David Hariton, a highly regarded practitioner at Sullivan & Cromwell, helped to draft the 
contingent debt regulations, offering his services pro bono.  Likewise, Gordon Henderson, a distinguished 
practitioner from Weil Gotshal, responded to proposed regulations under Section 752 by submitting 
alternative language, and the government drew heavily on his language in finalizing the regulation.  I am 
indebted to Mark Leeds for informing me of Mr. Henderson’s role.  
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actions.  As a result, plaintiffs’ lawyers, working for contingent fees, are supposed to pick 
up some of the slack. 
 The tax system does not have private actions under current law but, at least in 
theory, it could.  Congress could authorize qui tam actions, in which private citizens sue 
to collect taxes for the federal government, and keep a share of the recovery as a 
contingent fee.  Before briefly surveying the merits of these private tax actions, I should 
state at the outset that this idea is politically implausible, at least for the foreseeable 
future.  Not only is tax enforcement unpopular, but so too are trial lawyers, and this idea 
combines both.  
Even so, private tax actions do address the problems identified in this paper, at 
least to a degree.  Potentially lucrative contingent fees could attract a corps of extremely 
capable lawyers, who would be more of a match for the private bar than government 
lawyers currently are.  The allegiance of these lawyers would be to the tax base, not to 
taxpayers.  The prospect of being sued is likely to deter some aggressive planning. 
 Although this idea has advantages, it has many serious problems as well, which, 
on balance, leave me skeptical.  This idea is worth an article of its own, but I will use 
only a couple of paragraphs to highlight four problems  First, as with other class action or 
plaintiffs suits, there is the concern of frivolous strike suits.  It is commonly observed that 
plaintiff’s lawyers sue corporations every time the stock price declines, and that it is often 
cheaper to pay them off than to litigate.32  By analogy, it obviously is problematic for 
taxpayers to feel pressured to settle, even if their transaction is uncontroversial.  This 
problem might be ameliorated, to a degree, by requiring private tax collectors to secure 
approval from the government before bringing suit, and again for settlements.  But 
                                                 
32 See generally Coffee, supra note 22. 
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government supervision is a solution only if government officials have an incentive to 
say “no” to frivolous cases, and the time and expertise to discern the true value of a case.  
I doubt they would, so I view the problem of frivolous suits as extremely serious. 
 Second, there is the risk of collusion between taxpayers and these private tax 
collectors.  For example, if a taxpayer can secure a final judgment in settling a private 
suit – and thus is insulated from other suits, including by the government – there is room 
for a deal at the government’s expense.  The taxpayer offers the private tax collector a 
settlement, complete with a generous fee, for very little work; in return, the taxpayer is 
protected from further trouble.  Indeed, taxpayers are even happier if, in settling, they 
assure no further action – not just on the narrow issue that was settled – but on a more 
broadly defined set of issues that are related in some way to the one that was settled.  The 
potential for abuse is easy to see.33  Government or judicial oversight of settlements helps 
address this problem, but, again, only if it is effective.  It is worth emphasizing a reason 
why government oversight is unlikely to be effective: the premise behind creating a class 
of private attorneys general is that the government is overstretched.  If private attorneys 
general require significant government oversight, they have much less to add to the 
system. 
 Third, there is a tradeoff between protecting taxpayer privacy and arming private 
tax collectors with the information they need to identify underpayments and bring suit.  
Under current law, taxpayer returns are confidential, and the I.R.S. does not share them 
with anyone – not even with other parts of the federal government, such as the SEC.34  
                                                 
33 Cf. Kopel, supra note 62  (describing allegation that lawyers representing plaintiffs are colluding with 
defendant KPMG). 
34 See Anna Bernasek, Why Let the I.R.S. See What the S.E.C. Doesn’t?, New York Times, Feb. 5, 2006, at 
BU 3. 
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Under these conditions, private suits obviously are not possible.  The government would 
have to allow some disclosure.  This is not necessarily a problem in principle, since the 
privacy concerns that apply to an individual seem less compelling for a public company.  
It may be that these returns, or designated excerpts from them, could be publicly 
disclosed.  Private tax collectors might then be given special discovery power (perhaps 
under government or judicial supervision), subject to a confidentiality obligation.  Yet 
this is a logistically challenging road.  Another alternative is to give private tax collectors 
access to the special tax shelter disclosures mentioned above, and to authorize these 
private actions, and whatever further discovery is necessary, only for such transactions.  
Needless to say, this would be extremely controversial. 
 Finally, another potential problem with private tax actions is the somewhat 
counterintuitive problem of overenforcement.  In the current environment, it is perhaps 
hard to imagine too many resources being devoted to tax enforcement, since our current 
system is now so overstretched.  But just as we do not want to underinvest in 
enforcement, we also do not want to overinvest.  For example, a private tax collector 
would have the incentive to spend up to one dollar to collect a dollar fee.  If the 
contingent fee were one third, private collectors would be willing to spend up to one 
dollar to collect three dollars in tax, which is almost surely too much.35  To an extent, the 
problem can be mitigated by mandating that fees cannot exceed a fixed percentage of the 
tax collected (e.g., five percent).  But even then, the government should be wary of 
surrendering control over the number of suits brought, or the minimum level of tax that 
must be at issue in order to justify a suit.  This problem is likely to be solvable, but only 
with careful thought and a fairly elaborate administrative apparatus supervising the 
                                                 
35 See supra note 14. 
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private tax collectors; but, of course, having to field an elaborate system of supervision 
undercuts the original advantage of private suits, i.e., that they supplement scarce 
government enforcement resources. 
 
 III. Enlisting Private Lawyers: Find (or Create) Common Interests with the Client, 
and the Lawyer Will Follow 
 Now that we have considered various ways in which the government can hire 
advisors to work for them directly – either as full-time employees, on a project basis, or 
as a team of private attorneys general – the next question is whether the government can 
draw on the expertise of private lawyers without hiring them.  Given the political 
constraints on hiring elite lawyers directly, it would be desirable to tap into their expertise 
and information some other way.   
 A range of ideas are considered in the next two Parts, and some are more 
promising than others.  This Part identifies a range of contexts in which the interests of 
the government align with the interests of the client.  Once this occurs, the tax bar is 
motivated to help the government, since the bar is advancing client interests in the 
process.  The next Part moves to the harder set of cases in which the client’s interests do 
not support cooperation with the government. 
  A. Finding Common Interests With Taxpayers 
Since lawyers have ample reason to champion their client’s interests, the 
government can take advantage of the private bar’s expertise in situations in which the 
client wants to cooperate with the government.  This Section considers situations in 
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which the client is already motivated to cooperate.  Once the client wants to help, the 
lawyer obviously will do so dutifully – and, perhaps, even cheerfully.   
1. Taxpayer’s Incentive to Kill a Competitor’s Deal 
The most straightforward example – but one that has not received enough 
systematic attention – is for the government to take advantage of rivalries among 
taxpayers.  For instance, if one investment bank (“Innovator”) has developed a tax 
advantaged strategy, and a competing investment bank (“Competitor”) is not able to offer 
it – either because they think it does not work, or because they are entering the market too 
late – Competitor has the incentive to kill Innovator’s deal.  Competitor will want its 
lawyer to notify the government of this new strategy, and to explain its vulnerabilities.  
This might be done discreetly (e.g., by calling or even sending an anonymous envelope to 
the I.R.S.), or it might be done openly (e.g., by publishing an article in Tax Notes).  They 
are more likely to be discreet in order to avoid damaging their reputation (e.g., with the 
rival investment bank’s clients), but, either way, the government gains access to valuable 
information and expertise.   
This dynamic is not unique to the financial sector or to those who develop 
shelters.  Potential users can be a resource too.  Consider two rival consumer products 
companies, of which one has an aggressive tax director (Aggressive Co.) and the other 
has a conservative tax director (Conservative Co.).  If Aggressive Co uses a tax shelter to 
reduce its tax cost, and then passes some of this cost on to consumers in the form of 
lower prices, Conservative Co finds itself at a competitive disadvantage.  Assuming that 
Conservative Co is unwilling to adopt the same tax strategy, they have a strong incentive 
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to stop their competitor from using it.  They would be willing to pay their lawyer to place 
a discreet call to the government. 
Although the government already benefits from this dynamic to a degree,36 the 
government should take more systematic advantage of it in at least two ways, neither of 
which, to my knowledge, has been discussed in the literature.  First, the government 
should be more aggressive in offering bounties to informants, including former 
employees of the taxpayer, or employees of the taxpayer’s rival.37  Second, a concerted 
effort should be made to ask companies about their competitors’ tax planning.  For 
example, auditors can be instructed to ask something like, “Are there aggressive practices 
common in your industry that you do not use and, if so, what are they?   How do they 
work?  And how can we identify them?”  If companies are rewarded for producing this 
information – for instance, by developing a better rapport with their auditor in showing 
that they abstain from unsavory practices – they are likely to be forthcoming, thereby 
giving the government a useful source of information. 
This is not to say that competitors will always be forthcoming.  For example, they 
will hesitate if they fear an overbroad government response.  If they are engaging in 
conduct similar enough to be swept up in an overbroad response, they will not share the 
information.   
In cases where the government does get this sort of information, it obviously 
needs to respond – something that, unfortunately, it does not always do.  Indeed, it is not 
                                                 
36 When this paper was discussed at a session of approximately two-dozen leading practitioners, they 
immediately came up with three examples of transactions that had been shut down because of this sort of 
“tip” from a competitor: step-down preferred, as well as aggressive uses of Canadian income trusts and of 
commodities swaps.  This conversation occurred on February 27, 2006 at a meeting of the Tax Club in 
New York City. 
37 In the latter case, the bounty arguably should not go to the individual employee of the taxpayer’s rival, 
but to the corporation itself, since the employee’s knowledge is a corporate asset. 
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uncommon for the government to wait months or even years before responding to a 
planning technique that has been openly discussed.38  In other words, in addition to 
finding new sources of information, the government needs to make better use of the 
information it already has.  Ironically, “tips” from competitors serve another function as 
well – as a source not just of information, but also of motivation.  In some cases, the 
government is slow to react to an abusive transaction for political reasons.  
Countervailing political pressure from competitors can motivate (or even embarrass) the 
government into action. 
2. Taxpayer’s Incentive to Assist in Law Reform: Narrowing 
Overbroad Rules  
Just as taxpayers have the incentive to help the government kill competitor’s 
deals, they also have the incentive to help the government make overly harsh rules more 
lenient.  In other words, even if taxpayers are reluctant to tell the government about a bad 
transaction that the law technically allows, they are very motivated to tell the government 
about a good transaction that the law inadvertently prevents.39 
When the government targets an abuse, therefore, it is well advised to propose a 
rule that is broader than necessary.  To be clear, it may not wish to announce that it is 
doing this deliberately, as such an announcement could trigger a political outcry.  Such an 
announcement is unnecessary, though.  The tax bar will see that the rule is overbroad – 
whether or not it is announced as such – and the government can then rely on the tax bar, 
                                                 
38 For example, commentators have understood for some time that the Achilles heel of tax-free hedging is 
the counterparty’s interest in borrowing the taxpayer’s stock, and potential problems under Section 1058.  I 
discussed the point in detail in a 2001 article.  See Schizer, supra note 3.  The government waited nearly 
five years before responding.  See Lee A. Sheppard, Should Share Lending Affect a Prepaid Forward 
Contract, Tax Notes, Jan. 9, 2006, at 12. 
39 See Schizer, supra note 3, at 1337. 
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whose clients will want them to help narrow it.  In this way, the bar and the government 
have a similar goal.  They cooperate to modify the rule in order to permit desirable 
transactions.   
Admittedly, the incentives do not align perfectly.  The government wants to be 
sure that, in narrowing the rule, it still blocks all variations of the abusive transaction.  
The bar is less worried about that.  Indeed, there is the risk that the bar will propose 
language that spares not only a meritorious transaction, but also an abusive one.40  The 
government needs to be sensitive to this risk, and to take the bar’s advice with a grain of 
salt.  But the opportunity for collaboration is there, nevertheless. 
B. Creating Common Interests With Taxpayers Through the Penalty 
Structure 
If taxpayers truly feared the consequences of overly aggressive positions, they 
would have a strong interest in carefully complying with the law.  Obviously, this has not 
been the case in recent years.  Penalties have not been stiff enough to compensate for the 
low probability of detection.  The government has moved in the right direction by 
toughening the penalty structure through recent legislation, but more needs to be done.41   
The guiding principle ought to be increasing marginal deterrence.42  Taxpayers 
ought to feel that, by taking more risky positions, they significantly increase the penalty 
they would incur if caught.  This means that the penalty for fraud needs not only to be 
high in absolute terms, but also to be substantially higher than the penalty for negligence.  
                                                 
40 This pattern has played out with the new disclosure regime, discussed below.  It was overbroad, and the 
bar has worked with the government to develop “angel lists,” but taxpayers analogize to transactions on this 
list in order to conclude that they do not have to disclose transactions that, in light of the purposes of the 
regime, should be disclosed. 
41 Raskolnikov, supra note 6. 
42 Id. 
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By moving from a position that is debatable (or merely sloppy) to something that is 
clearly over the line, taxpayers should become exposed to a newly daunting level of risk. 
While this is a familiar point, there is an important implication that has not been 
sufficiently appreciated: By tweaking the penalty structure in the right way, the 
government enlists help from the private bar.  As long as the penalty structure is 
sufficiently daunting, clients will want their lawyers to help them steer clear of overly 
aggressive structures.  This, of course, is exactly what the government should want tax 
lawyers to do.  The private bar is, in effect, doing the government’s work, monitoring 
transactions to make sure they are not too aggressive.  In other words, the right penalty 
structure aligns the interests of the taxpayer with those of the government, and thus 
allows the government to rely on the private tax bar to police the system. To achieve this 
goal, though, the penalty structure must be crafted with care.  The rest of this section 
considers variations in the penalty structure, with a particular focus on the role of tax 
opinions. 
1. The Conflict Inherent in Tax Opinions 
What if the tax lawyer, in providing a written opinion that a transaction is taxed in a 
particular way, is able to offer a “get out of penalties free” card?  This generally was 
thought to be the case, at least until recently.43  As long as a taxpayer received an opinion 
indicating that a position was more likely than not to succeed, the taxpayer would claim 
to have reasonable cause to believe in her position, and thus would not expect penalties to 
be imposed.44  Likewise, the tax director of a corporation can expect to keep her job, even 
                                                 
43 See Rostain, supra note 5, at 117. 
44 Of course, the relevant regulation, 1.6664-4(e)(2)(B)(2) (as of April 2003), did not quite say this, but it 
was the conventional wisdom, nevertheless.  But even under that regulation, a court recently imposed a 
penalty on a taxpayer that had an opinion.  See Long Term Capital Management, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D 
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if a tax strategy proves unsuccessful, as long as she secured an opinion from an outside 
firm.  In authorizing tax lawyers to provide penalty protection (and thus “job insurance” 
for the tax director as well), the government is, in effect, enlisting the tax bar to monitor 
their clients, so that they will make sure their transactions comply with the law.   
As an effort to enlist the tax bar’s help, the practice of allowing penalty protection 
through tax opinions has a distinct advantage over, say, a mandate requiring tax lawyers 
to “rat” on clients who are engaged in overly aggressive transactions.  In acting as a 
source of potentially compromising information on clients, the lawyer is not offering the 
client anything of value.  In contrast, in offering a tax opinion for a transaction, the 
advisor is, indeed, providing something of value – protection from penalties (and, in the 
corporate context, job security for the tax director).  At first blush, this privileging of tax 
opinions seems to strengthen the hand of the tax lawyer, giving them leverage to extract 
concessions from the client.  “Structure the deal this way,” the lawyer can say, “or I will 
not give you the opinion.”  This at least creates the basis for cooperation between lawyer 
and client – the possibility of common interests, as the lawyer works with the client to 
ensure that the transaction is not too aggressive, and rewards them for doing the right 
thing.   
But it is a familiar point that, in a competitive environment, the tax lawyer’s hand is 
not strong enough.  If lawyers have this valuable carrot to offer, taxpayers will want to 
gobble it up, even if they haven’t earned it.  “Give me the opinion or I will take my 
business elsewhere” is the implicit (or sometimes even the explicit) message that clients 
                                                                                                                                                 
Conn 2004), aff’d 150 F. App’x 40 (2d Cir 2005).  A recent change in the penalty structure, discussed 
below, imposes strict liability for “reportable” transactions that have not been disclosed.  
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send.45  The result is a familiar race to the bottom, which the government has sought to 
reverse through a range of recent initiatives. 
2. Strict Liability 
The cleanest way to avoid this race to the bottom – but, unfortunately, one that 
has not been adopted on a broad scale46 – is to strip away the penalty protection function 
from tax opinions.  Under this approach, the fact that a taxpayer receives an opinion of 
counsel is no longer relevant in determining whether penalties should be imposed; rather, 
the penalty determination depends only on how aggressive the transaction is.  As a result, 
the tax opinion offers a prediction, not inherent protection.  It plays an important role in 
forecasting what the taxpayer’s exposure actually is, but only if it is honestly and 
carefully done.  If you win the case – because your deal is not too aggressive – you avoid 
penalties.  But if you lose, you are penalized.  If your lawyer advises you properly on the 
chances of winning, you know what the risks are, and you know what an appropriate 
settlement is as well.  But an opinion is no longer of inherent value.  Instead, it becomes 
only as valuable as the advice it gives. 
Under this approach, endorsed by the New York State Bar Association Tax 
Section, the lawyer’s incentive is exactly what it should be: to tell the client, in plain 
terms, exactly how aggressive a transaction is.47  There is no longer any race to the 
bottom, since the lawyer cannot deliver anything of value by offering an overly favorable 
conclusion.  By retooling the function of opinions in this way, the government enlists the 
                                                 
45 See Bankman, supra note 1, at 1782-83. 
46 Of course, narrow variations of a strict liability regime have been enacted for specified circumstances, 
and are discussed below.  The opinion of a disqualified tax advisor does not provide penalty protection, and 
an opinion offers no penalty protection for a reportable transaction that was not disclosed.   
47 See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Report on Corporate Tax Shelters, in NYSBA Applauds Some 
Anti-Corporate Tax Shelter Measures, Rejects Others, Apr. 23, 1999, Tax Notes Today, 1999 TNT 82-29. 
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help of the private bar: An expert is deployed for each transaction, in real time, to offer 
honest advice against taking overly aggressive positions. 
This approach, paired with an adequate penalty structure, would go a long way 
toward incentivizing the bar to help the government – not out of altruism, but out of 
fealty to client interests.  This is not to say, though, that the approach is uncontroversial.  
Are we really prepared to impose penalties when people believed in good faith, based on 
the advice of counsel, that they were complying with the law?  If a lawyer offers an 
opinion in good faith, shouldn’t that opinion in turn demonstrate good faith on the part of 
the client?  These arguments have political resonance, even though, in my opinion, they 
are unpersuasive.  After all, many favorable opinions are not offered in good faith – that 
is precisely the problem.  For those that are offered in good faith, I would leave it to the 
judge, or to the government official considering a settlement, to make a judgment about 
the appropriate penalty.  Or, as a compromise, the penalty structure could be segmented, 
so that an “information asymmetry charge” of, say, ten percent is automatically imposed 
(i.e., under strict liability) and an additional 15% penalty would be imposed for bad 
faith.48  But I realize that this approach is unlikely to be enacted in a comprehensive way.  
For political reasons, we are destined to allow tax opinions to provide some version of 
penalty protection.  How can we do this without triggering the familiar race to the 
bottom? 
3. Turning Competition Among Tax Advisors to the Government’s 
Advantage 
 Although every tax lawyer feels pressure to give an opinion that a competitor 
would give, it is not accurate to describe the problem as a single and unified race to the 
                                                 
48 I am indebted to Edward Kleinbard for this suggestion. 
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bottom.  Rather, there are a number of different races occurring at different tiers of the 
profession.  For example, the fact that a second tier accounting firm will give a favorable 
opinion is of real interest to another second tier accounting firm, but it is not particularly 
important to Sullivan & Cromwell. On the other hand, S&C will be extremely interested 
to know if another top law firm, such as Clearly Gottlieb, is willing to give a favorable 
opinion.  Another way to make this point is that it is a matter of pride – and, indeed, self 
interest – to refuse to give some opinions.  This is the way tax advisors build their 
reputations and signal the quality of their advice.  If a firm says “no” to many deals, then 
the fact that the say “yes” has real meaning (and thus can be the subject of premium 
billing).   
This sorting process – and the competition among advisors that animates it – 
represents a possible brake on the race to the bottom, as long as the government takes 
proper advantage of it.  Lawyers will want conservative reputations, and clients will want 
to hire such lawyers, if the government treats opinions of conservative lawyers more 
favorably than opinions of aggressive ones.  If the market comes to believe that an 
opinion from a top tier conservative firm is a necessity, and an opinion from a more 
aggressive competitor is valueless, then conservative advisors will have more bargaining 
power to hold clients to a higher standard.  Again, the private bar would be doing the 
government’s work.   
Although this insight is familiar, there obviously are a number of ways to 
operationalize it that, to my knowledge, have never been discussed in the literature.  One 
is for the government to keep a list of advisors who have given favorable opinions for 
shelters that have been rejected in court.  Similarly, this roster can include lawyers who 
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have given favorable opinions for so-called listed transactions (i.e., transactions 
designated suspect by the I.R.S.)  Of course, individual lawyers already have developed 
reputations with individual government lawyers, either for trustworthiness or for 
unreliability, but a list strengthens the effect of these reputations in two ways.  First, it 
institionalizes these reputations so that they survive turnover in the government’s ranks.  
Second, a list publicizes reputations, so that clients learn how the government views their 
lawyer.  The list can be used simply to embarrass these advisors – and this may be the 
only feasible use.  In theory, the government could give the list more teeth, but this is 
much more difficult.  For instance, the government could disqualify any lawyer or firm 
that appears on the list from giving opinions that provide penalty protection for a period 
of time, with escalating sanctions for repeat offenders.  By targeting the firm, as well as 
the individual, the government would mobilize firms to police their partners more 
diligently.  But although this step might have a useful disciplining effect, it would not be 
straightforward to impose, since the government presumably would also have to provide 
a means to appeal the sanction, and standards would have to be developed to decide what 
sort of advice is beyond the pale.   
At the other end of the spectrum, the government can look for ways to reinforce 
the reputations of conservative practitioners, however defined.  For example, the 
government could create an expedited revenue ruling process for these lawyers.  This 
could be quite attractive, since the current ruling process’s glacial pace renders it useless 
in many contexts.  In the same spirit, the government could rely on a (rebuttable) 
presumption that lawyers who have served in government are conservative, as a way to 
encourage government service.  Again, though, there may be need for a process to appeal 
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the government’s decision to deny this benefit to practitioners who are deemed to be 
insufficiently conservative, and there is always the concern that inappropriate factors will 
be considered in awarding some lawyers a special status that is denied to others.  
4. Mandates and Penalties: Circular 230 
Are there other ways, then, to encourage the bar to give opinions only for 
deserving transactions?  One way that lawyers have blessed undeserving transactions was 
to give only a partial opinion, which made unrealistic factual assumptions (e.g., “in 
giving this opinion, we rely on your representation that there is a realistic possibility to 
make a pretax profit”) or declined to address important anti-abuse doctrine (e.g., “in 
giving this opinion, we do not consider the application of the doctrines of economic 
substance and business purpose”).  Quite appropriately, the government has responded by 
requiring advisors to address all the relevant legal issues, including anti-abuse doctrines 
that might be relevant, and to scrutinize the facts, so that they do not rely on patently 
unrealistic representations.49   
Circular 230’s various technical problems are explored elsewhere, so I will not 
detail them here,50 except to say that this is a case in which the government has not been 
careful enough with the bar’s time.  For example, they should have used an “opt-in” 
regime, in which lawyers affirmatively state when an opinion can be used for penalty 
protection.  Instead, they created an “opt-out” regime, in which lawyers have to say when 
their advice cannot be so used.  The result has been a frenzy of legending, so that every 
email sent by a tax lawyer – including ones accepting a dinner invitation – automatically 
                                                 
49 10.35(b)(4)(ii). 
50 See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Paravano & Melinda Reynolds, The New Circular 230 Regulations -- Best Practices 
or Scarlet Letter, Tax Management Memo, Aug. 22, 2005; see also Michael Schler, Effects of Anti-Tax 
Shelter Rules on Non-Shelter Tax Practice, Tax Notes, Nov. 14, 2005. 
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say that they cannot be used for penalty protection. “Highly compensated tax advisors 
have spent time debating such questions,” Michael Schler has observed, “as whether the 
legend must be above the signature in an email, or may be below the signature . . . .”51  I 
doubt anyone would defend this use of the bar’s expertise. 
Putting aside these excesses, though, Circular 230 is, at its core, an effort by the 
government to enlist the tax bar’s help.  In requiring lawyers to verify facts and address 
all relevant issues, the government is relying on them to monitor clients, and to give 
opinions (and thus the potential for penalty protection) only when they are deserved.  
This initiative has both the promise and the problems associated with tax opinions, as 
discussed above.  In asking lawyers to monitor their clients, the initiative is strengthened 
by the fact that lawyers have something of value to give to their clients – so that they can 
feel, to a degree, as if they are serving client interests – but, at the same time, the inherent 
conflict remains: clients want opinions even when they don’t deserve them.   
The new rules make it more difficult for lawyers to give opinions for undeserving 
transactions, to be sure, but much depends on whether the penalties for noncompliance 
are adequate.  For example, a lawyer can be barred for life from practice before the I.R.S, 
a step that would be very embarrassing and could lead to disbarment in some states; but, 
of course, the I.R.S. has not sought to impose this sanction yet, even in egregious cases, 
leaving the bar to wonder whether they can safely ignore this possibility.  In any event, 
the function of the penalty provision is to drive a wedge between the lawyer’s interest 
and the client’s, focusing lawyers on the need to protect themselves.  In this way, the 
penalty provision is less like the initiatives discussed in this Part – which assume that the 
lawyer’s loyalty will remain with the client and try to align the client’s incentives with 
                                                 
51 See Schler, supra note 50.   
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the government – and is more like the initiatives discussed in Part IV, which try to detach 
the lawyer’s loyalty from the client.        
5. Separating Deal Practice from Opinion Practice 
In still another effort to ensure that tax opinions are rendered honestly, the 
government no longer allows lawyers to give opinions on certain “reportable” 
transactions52 – a category that is designed to describe tax shelters, but is widely known 
by tax lawyers to be both under- and over-inclusive53 – if they (or their firm) have billed 
enough hours to developing the transaction.  In fashioning this category of “disqualified 
advisor,” the government presumably was targeting shelter promoters.  But the definition 
sweeps more broadly so that, in effect, a lawyer who is implementing the transaction 
cannot give an opinion about it.  “As a result,” Michael Schler has observed, “if the 
taxpayer desires penalty protection, it must use one firm to draft the documents for the 
transaction, and another firm to give an opinion on the tax consequences of the 
transaction.”54   
 One advantage of this division of roles – that is, of having a “deal” counsel and a 
separate “opinion” counsel – is that, from the perspective of the deal counsel, the regime 
feels a lot like the strict liability regime recommended above: the incentive of deal 
counsel is to give honest advice, since offering an overly optimistic opinion is not an 
                                                 
52 Transactions are reportable if they satisfy any one of five filters: (1) listed transactions; (2) transactions 
in which the advisor imposes a condition of confidentiality to protect the advisor’s planning strategy; (3) 
transactions in which the advisor’s fee is contingent on the success of the planning strategy; (4) transactions 
in which a gross loss exceeds certain thresholds; and (5) transactions that involve credits and short holding 
periods for assets.  See Section 6111(a); Treas. Reg. 301.6112—(1)(c), 1.6011-4, Notice 2005-22, 2005-1 
Cum. Bull. 756. 
53 For example, many nonabusive transactions involve a large loss, since taxpayers sometimes genuinely do 
lose money.  At the same time, the filters leave out significant issues as well.  For example, although losses 
under Section 165 have to be reported, losses under Section 162 do not.  Schler, supra note 50.   
54See Schler, supra note 50. The regime applies only if certain modest fee thresholds are reached  -- 
$250,000 for C corporations and $50,000 for other taxpayers – and only if a significant purpose of the 
transaction is tax avoidance, but this phrase applies to many transactions that are not shelters.  See, e.g., 
Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991). 
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option for them anyway.  Notice, though, that the same benefit is available by 
disqualifying all lawyers, not just deal counsel, from giving penalty protection through an 
opinion, as recommended above.  
 In theory, there might be an advantage in preserving the penalty protection 
function of opinions, but cordoning it off so that it is available only through a separate set 
of opinion counsel.  This division of rules is appealing, though, only if we think opinion 
counsel is more independent than deal counsel, and thus is more likely to give an 
unbiased opinion.  The argument for this independence is that opinion counsel are not 
personally invested in the success of the deal, and they may also not have a preexisting 
client relationship with the taxpayer.   
Of course, even if we accept this premise, so that we think opinion counsel can 
make a valuable contribution, the current rules constrain them in bizarre ways.  For 
example, they are not allowed to suggest “material” modifications in the structure; if they 
do, they too become disqualified.  As Michael Schler has observed, this means opinion 
counsel “can either (1) suggest the changes, helping the taxpayer on the merits but 
hurting the taxpayer on penalty protection, or (2) refrain from suggesting the changes and 
give the opinion nonetheless, hurting the taxpayer on the merits but helping the taxpayer 
on penalty protection.”55  
Although this sort of glitch is probably fixable, and it is worth preventing actual 
shelter promoters (as opposed to advisors on regular business deals) from giving opinions 
that provide penalty protection, I am skeptical about the value, in general, of looking to 
separate opinion counsel, because I doubt that they are more independent.  Although 
opinion counsel may sort among “conservative” and “aggressive,” as noted above, there 
                                                 
55 Schler, supra note 50. 
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is no reason to think they are more likely to do so than deal counsel.  Indeed, opinion 
counsel have their own reasons to engage in a race to the bottom.  If they develop a 
reputation for readily blessing deals, they are more likely to be hired.  Advisors may be 
particularly eager for this work as an opportunity to get a new client, since they may hope 
that, if they make a good impression, they will be the deal counsel next time.  But even if 
they expect only to drum up more business as opinion counsel, this will be appealing 
because such work is interesting and relatively easy.  Opinion counsel do not have to 
negotiate deal terms, or draft deal documents in the middle of the night.  They have to 
understand the structure and the relevant law – with the assistance of deal counsel, 
obviously – and then write up the analysis.  If they can bill premium rates, the 
engagement is quite attractive.  In addition, if opinion counsel has made a regular practice 
of issuing aggressive opinions, the incremental risk from giving one more aggressive 
opinion is modest.  For all these reasons, the incentives of opinion counsel strike me as 
no better, on average, than the incentives of deal counsel (aside, of course, from shelter 
promoters).  The only benefit here is in removing the opinion-writing function from the 
lawyer doing the deal.  A much cleaner way to do that, though, is the strict liability 
approach discussed above.   
  
6. Disclosing the Opinion as a Condition of Penalty Protection 
 The race to the bottom among opinion writers is a very difficult problem, then, 
and it does not become easier in requiring a separate opinion counsel to write it.  But 
there is a worthwhile measure that should be implemented – and, thus far, the 
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government has done so only partially:  The government should say that an opinion 
cannot be used for penalty protection unless it is attached to the tax return.56 
 Instead of requiring disclosure of the opinion itself, the government has begun 
requiring disclosure about the transaction as a condition for penalty protection in some 
cases.  Specifically, if the transaction is otherwise “reportable,”57 the reasonable cause 
exception is not available if the transaction was not disclosed.58   This is a step in the 
right direction, since the opinion cannot offer penalty protection if the taxpayer tries to 
hide the transaction.  
 It would be even better, though, to require disclosure of the opinion itself.  Under 
the revised Circular 230, the opinion has to lay out the issues presented in the transaction, 
serving, in a sense, as a roadmap for the government to challenge the transaction.  This 
step would significantly reduce the government’s costs in analyzing the transaction, and 
also would deter aggressive planning, since taxpayers would have to expose the 
transaction’s vulnerabilities in order to secure penalty protection.59  Of course, taxpayers 
may be concerned that rogue auditors will misuse the opinion, and some procedural 
mechanism, such as input from a centralized office (such as the Office of Tax Shelter 
Analysis), is needed to address this concern.  But however the opinion is used by the 
government, it is much less valuable to the taxpayer if it is not persuasive: even if the 
                                                 
56 Michael Schler suggested this idea over three years ago.  See Michael Schler, 10 More Truths About Tax 
Shelters, 55 Tax L. Rev. 325 (2002) 
57 For a discussion, see supra note 52. 
58 The government originally introduced this rule administratively, and then confirmed its authority to do 
so in the Jobs Act.  See Treas Reg. 1.6664.4 (failure to disclose reportable transaction was a “strong 
indication that the taxpayer did not act in good faith” for purposes of accuracy related penalty); see I.R.C. 
6664(d)(2)(B)-(C) (eliminating reasonable cause for undisclosed transactions and thus subjecting taxpayers 
who fail to disclose reportable transaction to 30% penalty). 
59 In serving as a source of information for the government, which could then use this information in 
reevaluating existing law, this proposal is a variation of the “new governance” or “experimentalist” 
approach to regulation developed by colleagues at Columbia.  For a discussion, see infra note 68 and 
accompanying text. 
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opinion protects the taxpayer from penalties, it makes them more likely to have to pay the 
underlying tax.  If an opinion must be turned over in this way, taxpayers will be less 
satisfied with a document that offers an overly optimistic bottom line.  Rather, the 
taxpayer will want to be sure the opinion is right, and that the transaction actually works.  
As with the strict liability regime discussed above, this approach creates exactly the right 
incentive for the private bar.  They will be asked to give honest advice about how to 
comply with the law. 
Given these useful effects, this requirement should be imposed not just for 
reportable transactions – an imperfect category, as noted below – but for any transaction 
for which the taxpayer wants penalty protection.  This is critical, since a substantial 
volume of shelters are not reportable transactions, but are simply deals that have no 
business purpose or economic substance. 
IV. Enlisting the Private Bar: Drive a Wedge Between the Lawyer and Client 
 
 In considering ways to enlist the tax bar’s help for the government, the prior Part 
focused on tasks that would, at least to an extent, be in the client’s interest.  This Part, in 
contrast, considers ways to pressure the private bar for help, even if giving this help is not 
in their client’s interest.  In a sense, the goal here is to detach the lawyer from the client, 
something that is very hard to do.  As a result, the initiatives in this Part are generally less 
promising than those in the prior Part, although some are more appealing than others. 
 
 A. Sanctions 
 Given that lawyers are strongly predisposed to pursue client interests, the 
government will have to create a powerful counterweight to distract them from this 
mission.  One obvious reason for a lawyer to favor the government over client interests is 
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self interest – and, in particular, fear of various penalties.  For example, the government 
recently indicted a tax lawyer for aiding and abetting tax fraud in connection with 
KPMG’s tax shelter business.60  Circular 230 contains new penalties as well.61  There 
have also been a number of malpractice actions brought against lawyers who gave 
favorable opinions in shelter cases.62  In theory, the government could create a similar 
system in which it looks to lawyers to bear a portion of the understatement penalty 
imposed when a deal they blessed is successfully challenged. 
 Obviously, though, such sanctions are only effective if lawyers actually expect to 
be punished. A malpractice judgment is embarrassing, but there are a range of reasons 
why malpractice claims are unlikely to succeed in this context, including the proliferation 
of arbitration clauses.63  Criminal indictments are an even more powerful disciplining 
device.  However badly a client may want a result, lawyers will not go along if they 
believe they are risking their professional licenses, their solvency, and even their 
freedom.64  On the other hand, if people think that such indictments are a fluke, they are 
not effective.  Likewise, some who are at risk of being indicted may not realize it, since, 
human nature being what it is, people sometimes deceive themselves into believing their 
bad behavior is justifiable.  An unfortunate consequence of this sort of sanction is that 
                                                 
60 For a discussion, see Lynnley Browning, I.R.S Offers Deal to Firms Promoting Tax Shelters, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 14, 2006, at C1. 
61 See generally Paravano & Reynolds, supra note 50. 
62 See, e.g., Nathan Kopel, Law Firm Offers An Unusual Fee in KPMG Case, Wall Street J., Jan. 27, 2006.  
63 Of course, if the government wants malpractice to be a more effective sanction, they can discourage the 
use of arbitration clauses (e.g., by saying that a tax opinion cannot provide penalty protection if the lawyer 
and client are bound by an arbitration clause).  I thank Bill Simon for this observation. 
64 Correspondingly, offers not to prosecute can sometimes induce cooperation.  The government has tried 
this tack with promoters, so far with mixed results.  See Browning, supra note 60, at C1 (noting that 
government has offered to spare promoters from prosecution if promoters pay penalties and turn over 
information, but that some promoters are likely not to accept the deal). 
 54
risk tolerant lawyers will have an advantage over risk averse ones, since some number of 
risk tolerant lawyers will push the line without being caught. 
 Another risk with sanctioning the lawyer is to make sure that such sanctions do 
not create bad incentives for the client.  The obvious example is malpractice.  Clients will 
be more likely to engage in shelters if they believe they can pass on their penalties or 
other costs to their advisors.65  
B.  Disclosure 
In a truly unusual development, the government has recently required tax advisors 
to keep lists of clients who engage in tax shelters, which they must turn over to the 
government upon request, and also to disclose the details of these deals in some cases.66  
(A parallel disclosure regime has also been imposed on clients).67   
At first blush, it is easy to see why the government wishes to try this.  Tax 
advisors have much more information than the government about what taxpayers actually 
are doing.  By gathering this information, the government hopes to fashion more effective 
rules, closing loopholes and shutting down abusive practices.  Indeed, this regime seems, 
at first glance, to be an intriguing example of what colleagues at Columbia call 
“experimentalism” or “new governance.”  The essence of this approach is for the 
decisionmaker to gather information, propose tentative rules, gather further information 
                                                 
65 The question becomes more complicated if malpractice insurance covers these judgments, and lawyers 
are able to pass the cost of insurance on to clients in the form of higher rates.  For instance, the end result 
may be that conservative clients subsidize aggressive ones (assuming the lawyer does not charge 
sufficiently different rates for standard and overly aggressive advice).   
66 See Section 6112(b), 6708, 6111, 6707. 
67 See Section 6011, 6707A.  
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to see whether these rules are effective, and revise the rules.  Under this view, good 
governance depends on rolling standards and constant efforts to gather information.68   
Yet as one looks more closely at this disclosure initiative, it inspires less 
confidence.  In assigning the tax bar this function, the government offers only sticks, 
without carrots.  Failure to comply carries penalties, to be sure, but faithful and 
meaningful compliance carries no discernable reward.  Most notably, the lawyer is not 
advancing client interests in providing this disclosure.  Quite the contrary, the lawyer is in 
effect being asked to “rat” on the client.  Unlike in the case of writing opinions, where the 
lawyer must comply with the mandates of Circular 230 but is, at least, providing 
something of value to the client, the bar here is being drafted to work for the government, 
and the government alone. 
Not surprisingly, then, the tax bar is highly motivated to undermine the 
effectiveness of this effort.  The goal is to be able to say they are complying, but without 
providing truly helpful information.  Taxpayers and their advisors use aggressive 
readings of the relevant “filters” to conclude that they do not have to disclose some 
shelters.  At the same time, the bar also reads the filters fastidiously to conclude that they 
must disclose transactions that are not at all objectionable.  In some cases, this is an 
excess of caution, since the filters are vague, and there is little to be lost, from the client’s 
perspective, in disclosing these deals.  But there is also a bit of gamesmanship at work 
here.  By flooding the government with paper, lawyers make it all the more difficult for 
the government to find the truly useful disclosure.  There is no penalty, after all, for 
                                                 
68 Indeed, this pattern is familiar to tax lawyers, since most new rules – whether statutes or regulations – are 
initially proposed in draft, and then are revised in response to comments.  Likewise, informal authorities 
such as revenue rulings are sometimes revoked or superseded in response to new information or changed 
circumstances. 
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adding hay to the haystack, in order to make the needle harder to find.  Time will tell, of 
course, just how useful this initiative proves to be for the government.  But to my mind, it 
is a questionable use of scarce resources and political capital. 
C. Patriotism and Professional Duty to the System 
Instead of relying on the bar’s fear of sanctions, the government could try 
appealing to their professional pride and patriotism.  Although there is no consensus on 
the point, many commentators believe that tax lawyers owe a duty not just to their clients, 
but also to the system.  One formulation, advanced by Bill Simon, is that the tax system 
gives tax lawyers their livelihood, so they in turn owe a duty to nurture it.  My own view 
relies less on this narrow reciprocity, and more on the gratitude that any citizen should 
feel for the freedom and security the U.S. government provides; if we feel grateful, we 
should want to preserve the government’s lifeline, the tax system. 
Perhaps in some cases, this sort of altruistic motive will guide tax advisors – after 
all, life is about more than billing hours.  But it is naïve to rely too heavily on these 
motives.  For one thing, some take a different view of their patriotic duty, focusing on the 
fact that the government wastes money, and that I.R.S. agents can be petty tyrants.  Under 
this view, it is a patriotic contribution to keep resources in the more dynamic private 
sector and to protect clients from bureaucratic bullies. 
In any event, however a tax lawyer views our tax system, she is unlikely to be 
guided by sentiment alone, or by a professional duty that is unenforceable.  Professor 
Lavoie urges legal academics to use their bully pulpits, inculcating students with a sense 
of their professional duty to the system, so that they will be faithful to this imperative 
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after they graduate.69  I certainly favor an emphasis on professional responsibility in the 
tax curriculum – indeed, in the entire law school curriculum – but I don’t think we should 
overstate the staying power of these lessons.   
Advisors are most likely to follow their better angels when they are in an 
institutional setting that frees them to do so.  Indeed, the goal of this paper is to identify 
the most promising settings – for instance, when they serve in government, when they 
participate in bar association activities, or, of course, when their client’s interests point in 
this direction.  But outside of these safe settings, the patriotism of tax lawyers generally is 
too slender a reed to support cooperation with the government. 
 
 IV. Conclusion 
 The mismatch between the government and the private bar contributes 
significantly to tax shelters and to the inefficiency and inequity that aggressive planning 
brings to our system.  This Article has offered two reasons why the mismatch is so hard 
to remedy.  First, it is politically difficult to fund a truly robust public infrastructure for 
tax administration.  Second, the private bar does not have incentive to pick up the slack; 
on the contrary, their clients ordinarily view tax administrators as the enemy, and thus do 
not want the bar to be of help 
 An important challenge, then, is to identify contexts in which the client and the 
government have common interests, so that the tax lawyer can “do good and do well” at 
the same time.  These contexts are few and far between, but they do exist, and this Article 
has emphasized some that have not received sufficient attention.  There are times, also, 
                                                 
69 See generally Lavoie, supra note 4.  
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when a lawyer’s loyalties can be detached from the interests of private clients, if the 
carrot or stick applied directly to them is strong enough.   
At the end of the day, though, the private bar can serve only a limited function.  
Raising the quality of the government’s efforts is vital.  This Article has offered a range 
of steps that should not attract too much political opposition.  Any opposition that does 
arise should be resisted strenuously, because there truly is no substitute for competent tax 
administration.  Starving this infrasturcture is a poor way to cut taxes, as this path 
encourages wasteful planning, benefits aggressive taxpayers more than conservative 
ones, and ultimately breeds disrespect for the law.  It would be far wiser to cut rates.  
Indeed, if we paired rate cuts with more robust investments in tax administration, and 
thus more effective efforts to curtail aggressive planning, we might well find a revenue 
neutral path to a more efficient and equitable tax system. 
